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IV

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This appeal is taken from the order dismissing Appellants Louis and Patricia Caravella
("Caravellas") counterclaims for fraud and misrepresentation, as contained in the district court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and order of dismissal, and resulting judgment entered by
the District Court for the Seventh Judicial District in Teton County following a full trial, with the
court acting as finder of fact. This consolidated lawsuit originated as two separate actions seeking
to foreclose mechanics liens filed by Respondent Frontier Development Group, LLC ("FDG") and
Yellowstone Do It Center, LLC ("Yellowstone"). Yellowstone is not involved in this appeal. Both
actions related to work and materials allegedly provided on the construction of a home (the "Home"
or the "Property") for the Caravellas.

The Caravellas counter-claimed against FDG and

Yellowstone, and joined Respondent Michael Horn ("Horn"), the principal owner/manager ofFDG,
as a counter-defendant.

The Caravellas sought damages for, inter alia, breach of contract,

construction defects, consumer protection violations, slander of title and fraud. Following trial, the
district court dismissed both FDG's and Yellowstone's lien claims, and awarded damages, fees and
costs to the Caravellas against FDG in the total amount of$245,525, and against Yellowstone in the
amount of $29,865.

The district court did not, however, award any damages against Horn

personally. (R. Vol. II P. 387.)
The primary issues on appeal address fraud and the personal liability of Horn. Appellants
respectfully submit that the district court failed to properly apply its own findings of fact when it
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concluded that Caravellas proved only eight of the nine elements of fraud, failing only to prove that
Hom knew his statements were false. Appellants further assert that the district court also erred in
failing to conclude that Hom is personally liable as an agent for an undisclosed principal because
he failed to disclose that he was acting for FDG before or at the time he contracted with the
Caravellas, and also that Hom is liable as the alter ego ofFDG.

B.

Course of Proceedings Below

1.

FDG filed its Complaint for foreclosure on February 20,2009. (R. Vol. I, P. 1.)

2.

The Caravellas filed their Answer and Counterclaim to FDG' s Complaint, and joined

Hom as a counterdefendant on April 6, 2009, seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach ofthe Consumer Protection Act, slander of
title, and misrepresentation.

CR. Vol. I, P. 5.)

3.

Yellowstone filed its Complaint for foreclosure on June 1,2009.

4.

The cases were consolidated on December 1,2009.

5.

Caravellas filed their Answer to Yellowstone's Complaint on January 29,2010.

6.

Caravellas filed an Amended Counterclaim on October 19,2010, seeking damages

from Hom and FDG for breaches of contract, implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
Consumer Protection Act, and the warranty of habitability, as well as slander of title, fraud and
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy; Caravellas sought damages from Yellowstone for slander
of title, civil conspiracy and negligence.

CR. Vol. I, P.
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122.)

7.

HornlFDG and Yellowstone filed their Answer to the Amended Counterclaim on

November 12,2010, and an Amended Answer to Amended Counterclaim on November 18,2010.
CR. Vol. I, P. 136, 143.)
8.

The trial was held December 13-16,2011, with the court acting as finder of fact.

9.

The Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on March 29, 2012. (R.

Vol. II, P. 316.)1
10.

On October 31,2012, the Court entered an Order and Final Judgment awarding

attorney fees, cost and prejudgment interest to the Caravellas against FDG in the total amount of
$245,525, and against Yellowstone in the total amount of$29 ,865. Caravellas' claims against Horn
personally were dismissed. (R. Vol. II, P. 368,386.)
11.

Caravellas filed a Notice of Appeal on December 12,2012. CR. Vol. II, P. 389.)

C.

Concise Statement of Facts

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court concluded that the Caravellas
failed to prove Horn/FDG's knowledge ofthe falsity of various misrepresentations. However, the
district court's own findings offact and other evidence in the Record demonstrate that the Caravellas
in fact proved the scienter element of fraud.

Subsequent references to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law will refer to
either the "Findings #" or "Conclusions #", and the page number where it can be found in
Volume II of the Clerk's Record.
I
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1.

Facts Regarding the "Condition, Quality and Value of the Home and
Workmanship of the Construction Performed on the Home Before
[Caravellas] Purchased It," and Demonstrating Horn's Overall Intent to
Misrepresent Facts.

ill March, 2008, the Caravellas resided in Ohio and were looking to purchase a horne in Teton

Valley for their retirement. The Caravellas' real estate agent, Mark Griese, told them about the
partially constructed Horne (the subject of this lawsuit), which was being listed by another agent in
his office, Kathleen Horn. (Findings #26, p. 324-25.) The Horne had been under construction by
her husband, Michael Horn. The Horne was about half completed before the original owner, Richard
Myers ("Myers), encountered financial difficulty and declared bankruptcy. (Findings #6-8, p. 319.)
Myers' lender, First Horizon Horne Loans ("First Horizon"), had initiated foreclosure proceedings
on the Property when the Caravel1as became interested in purchasing it. (Findings #9, 26, p. 319.)
Horn's dealings with Myers and First Horizon demonstrate his overall fraudulent intent and
disregard for the truth. During the time when Horn/FOG was constructing the Horne for Myers,
HornJFDG submitted pay requests to First Horizon and was paid a total of$656, 173. (Findings # 12,
p. 320.) With each pay request, Horn certified that the improvements for which payment was sought
had been "completed as per the 'Plans and Specifications' ... except for the 'Change Orders' listed
below," and that all bills from the previous draw had been paid. (Findings #10-12, p. 320-21.)
Nevertheless, there were several substantial items of work for which Horn was paid in full
after certifying that they were complete, but which were neither installed nor found on the Property
when the Caravellas later purchased the Horne, (Findings #13-25, p. 321-323), including the
following:
4

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
I.

$10,879 for siding materials, (Findings #13-18, p. 321-22);
$5,725 for staining 19,744 linear feet of siding and exterior trim, (Jd.);
$15,000 for 100% of the required soffit and facia, (!d.);
$3,500 for a propane tank, certified as 100% completed, (Findings #19);
$5,000 for steel beams, certified as 100% completed, (Findings #20);
$5,000 for fireplace inserts, (Findings #21);
$24,000 for a septic tank and well, certified as 100% completed, (Findings #22);
$14,397.98 for cabinets, (Findings #23); and
$3,500 for roof flashing, certified as 100% completed, (Findings #24).

Thus, more than $87,000 worth of labor or materials were never performed or installed,
despite Hom's multiple certifications under oath that the work was completed and his receipt offull
payment for such actually incomplete work. Accordingly, the amount of work and materials that
were actually completed on the Home was no more than $570,000, and perhaps less.
When construction was halted for Myers in March 2007, significant framing issues remained,
including an incomplete roof, exposed door openings, exposed window openings and incomplete
structural framing. Thus, the Home was left exposed to snow, rain, sun and wind for at least
fourteen months. (Findings #8, p. 319.)
When the Caravellas later became interested in the Property, nearly all of the
communications with Hom were conducted via email, all of which were admitted as evidence at
trial. (Findings #27, p. 324; Hom testimony, Tr. Vol. I., p. 402, L. 12-21; Defs Exhibits A-E; PI's
Exhibits 9-18.) In their initial contacts, Hom advised the Caravellas that the Property had been
"sitting untouched for over a year." (Findings #27.) Hom also advised the Caravellas that First
Horizon would not sell the Property for less than $800,000. (!d.) Hom represented to the Caravellas
"that the value of the property was $1.2 million dollars, with $800,000 worth of construction
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completed and the lot having a value of $400,000." (Findings #28.) Caravellas submit that it was
impossible for Horn not to have known he had truly performed at most $570,000 worth of
construction on the Home, as explained above. Thus, Caravellas were led to believe a substantially
greater proportion of construction had been completed towards finishing a $1.2 million project.
Horn also "represented his skills as a builder in 'superlative terms, '" and he told the
Caravellas that he was "one of the best builders, if not the best," in Teton Valley. "He told them that
regarding home interiors, 'many have tried' to match his interior work, 'but all have failed. '"
(Findings #29, p. 324.) In an email sent to the Caravellas on March 21,2008, Horn represented that
"[m]y personal cabinet maker sets up shop in your garage .... NO other builder can touch my
cabinets and my guy only works for me." (March 21 email, Ex. D, p. 6-7.) At trial, however, Horn
admitted that other than two homes he built for himself, one of which was a in Utah, he had only
been involved with building eight other homes, all of which were constructed between 2006 and
2009, and that Myers' house was only the third or fourth. (Findings #157-60, p. 346; Tr. Vol I, p.
373,375-77,411-12.) Moreover, "Horn testified that he has no actual hands-on construction skills.
He has not performed concrete, framing, HVAC, electrical, or any other construction work."
(Findings #30, p. 324.) All of the actual work on the homes he "built" was actually performed by
subcontractors, (Findings # 159, p. 346), which would necessarily include the interior work that "all
have failed" to match. Certainly, Horn could not have believed that the best cabinet maker in the
area worked solely for someone who only built 8 houses, nor that the subcontractors who actually
performed such praiseworthy interior work could somehow not duplicate it in other homes.
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Also during their early email correspondence, discussing the cost of construction, "Horn
informed the Caravellas that 'Chase's' construction loan rates were the best, but not ifthe loan was
for a 'second' home." (Findings #31, p. 325.) Horn recommended that the Caravellas make false
representations to "Chase" bank to secure the best available financing.

He advised that the

Caravellas should "apply for the loan and initially represent that they were trying to sell their existing
home, so that they could obtain the most favorable financing. They were then advised to 'change
[their] mind' about selling their first home when the construction was completed." (Jd.) This type
of advice is indicative of Horn's character and general disregard for the truth?
"Mr. Caravella testified that he relied upon Horn's statements concerning his skills as a
builder. He testified that Horn's persuasive assurances and statements about his skills and experience
caused them to trust him and to rely upon his representations." (Findings #32, p. 325.) In contrast
to Horn's bold claims about his skills, the district court found that Horn was incompetent as a
general contractorlbuilder. (Conclusions #47, p. 356, and #44, p. 355.)
The district court found that "[b ]ased on the information the Caravellas received from Horn
about the home," they offered to purchase the property from Myers in early April, 2008. (Findings
#33-34, p. 325.) Less than two hours after the Caravellas accepted a counteroffer from Myers, whose
real estate agent was Horn's wife, "Horn recorded a new mechanics lien for $23,000 against the
property on behalf ofFDG." (Findings #36, p. 325.) According to Horn's testimony, the basis for

2 It should be noted that the Caravellas rejected Horn's advice. They proceeded with
construction without a loan, on a cash-available basis.
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the lien was a temporary handrail installed in the Home, as well as unpaid old work performed for
Myers. (Findings #37, p. 325; Tr. Vol. I, p. 477.) Hom's self-serving assertions are wholly
contradicted by his own representations to the Caravellas that the Home had sat untouched for over
a year. (Findings #27, p. 324.) The obviously unfounded and wrongfullien3 was paid in full when
Caravellas closed on the Property. (Findings #37, p. 325.)
Pursuant to the purchase and sale agreement with Myers, the Caravellas had the opportunity
to inspect the Property and terminate the agreement. (PI's Exhibit 3, p. 2.) In late April 2008, the
Caravellas traveled from Ohio to Teton Valley to meet with Hom and inspect the Property. They
reviewed detailed drawings ofthe house plans with Hom, and met with him on two consecutive days
to review and inspect the Property. (Findings #38, p 325-26.) "The Caravellas testified that Hom
pointed out just two interior framing/structural issue during his inspection ofthe property: a missing
support post and an inadequate structural beam. Hom told them that the beam would need to be
enhanced." (Findings #41, p. 326.) "Hom advised the Caravellas that certain structural, framing and
leaking issues needed to be remedied as soon as possible. Mrs. Caravella testified that while she had
concerns about water intrusion into the house, Hom minimized the problems and told the Caravellas
the Home was 'in good shape,' 'structurally sound' and a 'great house. ", (Findings #42, p. 326; see
also Findings #69, p. 331.) Hom did not disclose any other deficiencies in the construction of the

Home, (Findings #70, p.331), nor did he disclose the fact that he had "modified the written plans for

3 Idaho Code § 45-507 requires filing a lien with 90 days of completion of the last work.
Hom's last work was more than a year previous.
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the roofwithout an architect or engineer's involvement." (Findings #108, p. 338.) The modification
was ultimately found to be defective and required repair/correction to stop leaking. (Jd.)
The district court ultimately concluded that in purchasing the Property "the Caravellas relied
heavily upon Hom's representations as to the condition of the Home. In lieu of bringing in an outside
inspector, Caravellas relied upon the builder [Hom] who would be completing the home to confirm
its condition. . .. Hom knew that Caravellas were relying upon his assessment of the home's
condition." (Conclusions #37, p. 354.)

2.

Additional Facts Regarding Progress and Quality of the Work
Performed By Horn/FDG Pursuant to the Contract

The Caravellas and Hom agreed "that the home would be constructed in accordance with the
original written plans, subject to Caravellas' requested changes." They further agreed that the Home
would be completed in phases, and that a new phase would not be approved until the previous phase
was complete and the Caravellas confirmed that they had sufficient funds. The goal ofthe first phase
was to shore up all structural defects and get the exterior enclosed before winter. (Findings #55 and
57, p. 328-29.)
The total contract price for the work authorized by the Caravellas on the Home for the first
phase was $88,500, itemized as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Exterior stone, structural framing and roof ridge vents: $50,000;
Exterior wrap, siding and stain: $35,000;
Exterior plumbing and electrical rough-ins: $2,500;
Two additional windows: $1,000; and
Additional stone on the utility room: no additional cost.

(Findings #61, p. 329; see also Findings # 58 and 60.)
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At various times throughout the project for CaraveIlas, as he had done when building for
Myers, Hom misrepresented to the Caravellas that major, critical portions of the work had been
completed according to the plans when, in fact, such work was neither completed nor did it conform
to the plans. Those items include the exterior stone work, (Findings #66, p. 330; #111-12, p. 33839); the exterior siding, (Findings #72-73, p. 331); garage and "bam" doors, (Findings #82-83, p.
333); and ridge vents and flashing on the roof, (Findings #71, p. 331). Hom also had identified two
specific structural framing issues, which he advised needed to be completed "ASAP," but he never
had any work done on either structural issue. (Findings #69-70, p. 331.)
Not only did Hom fail to complete these items of contracted work, he billed the Caravellas
far in excess of the full contract price for those items. (Findings #65 and 72.) Moreover, the work
was found to be replete with serious, latent construction defects, (Findings #395-110, p. 335-38),
including some that created "life safety issues," (Findings #103, p. 337).

3.

Additional Facts Regarding "the Cost of Materials Used in the
Construction"

The district court specifically found that "FDG and Horn's prior dealings with Myers and
First Horizon also showed a pattern ofbiIling for materials that were never used in constructing the
home." (Findings #137, p. 343) (emphasis added). HornlFDG continued this pattern in billing the
Caravellas.
"Hom billed the Caravellas a total of $86,500 ... for the exterior stonework, fixing the
structural framing, and fixing the leaking roof/ridge vents, which are the tasks he had agreed to
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complete for $50,000," despite the fact that he never actually completed the work. (Findings #65-71,
p.330-31.)
"Hom billed the Caravellas a total of$74,350 (labor, materials and contractor fee) for siding,
which he had agreed to complete for $35,000," again, despite the fact that the work was not even
completed, (Findings #72-73, p. 331; #146, p. 344). Hom and Yellowstone billed Caravellas for
"nearly six times the amount of soffit material than was necessary to complete the job," (Findings
#114 and 137-38, p. 339 and 343); between two and five times the amount necessary for various
sizes of window trim, (Findings 116-17); twice as much Tyvek building wrap than was necessary,
(Findings # 119); and nearly double the amount of cedar siding required for the entire exterior of the
Home, (Findings #121, p. 343.) Horn/FDG previously had been paid over $30,000 from First
Horizon for these (uninstalled) items. (Findings #13-18, p. 321-22.)
"Hom billed the Caravellas a total of$29,040.89 for installed 'Garage & Bam Doors.' It is
undisputed that only the three garage doors were ever installed -the bam doors were never installed.
The Court finds that Hom's bill to the Caravellas erroneously included the uninstalled bam doors."
(Findings #82, p. 333.) "FDG overbilled the Caravellas by $12,645.89 for the garage doors."
(Findings #83, p. 333.)
Even though the agreed price for phase one of the work was only $88,500, (Findings #61,
p. 329), the Caravellas ultimately paid Horn/FDG a total of $138,097.24 "fur the work that Hom
represented had been done on the property," but which was never actually completed. (Findings
#126-27, p. 341.) This amount included payments for additional, unauthorized work, including
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$19,900 for concrete work that was both defective and poured in the wrong location, (Conclusions
#32, p. 353), and the garage and bam doors for which Caravellas were overbilled. The district court
expressly found that "[i]n addition to the work that was not authorized, FDG also billed the
Caravellas for completion of all the stonework, all the siding, and repair ofthe structural issues, none
of which were actually completed." (Findings #147, p. 345.)
Unbeknownst to the Caravellas, Hom and Yellowstone had agreed that Yellowstone's bill
would be paid last. After Caravellas stopped Hom's work-after having already overpaid the
contract price- Yellowstone claimed an additional amount owed of over $75,000 and recorded a
lien on the Property. (Findings #136 and 139, p. 343.) Hom also claimed the Caravellas still owed
him about $30,000 in addition to what had already been paid. (Findings #141, p. 344.)
The district court expressly found that "HornJFDG and Yellowstone should have known that
they substantially overbilled the Caravellas for the work and materials actually provided," that they
"displayed a cavalier indifference to accepted accounting and inventory control procedures," and that
they "demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of their sworn statements" regarding
the work and materials actually provided to the Caravellas. (Conclusions #55, p. 358.) The Court
further concluded that HornJFDG "should have known that it had already received full payment from
the Caravellas pursuant to its contract with them .. "

HornJFDG and Yellowstone's actions in

recording their liens were clearly reckless, erroneous, and wrongful." (Conclusions #56, p. 358.)
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4.

Facts Regarding the Operation of FDG

FDG is owned by Hom and his realtor wife, Kathleen. According to Hom's testimony,
Kathleen owns a small percentage of ownership in FDG, but has no specific duties and does not
participate in the business ofFDG. (Findings #156, p. 346.) Hom admitted that "FDG acts only
through him, never hired any employees, did not own any assets at the time of trial, and that all of
FDG's profits were taken by him as his personal income, although he does not receive any
compensation as a manager or employee of FDG." (Findings #157, p. 346.) Hom testified that
during the time FDG was involved with the Caravellas' construction, FDG owned two telescopic
forklifts, (id.; Tr. Vol. II, P. 910, L. 24 through P. 911, L. 10.), but he did not produce any
documentation to back up his claim. In his deposition, admitted into evidence as Exhibit DDDD,
Hom testified that FDG owned only one forklift and no other assets. (Exhibit DDDD, Hom
Deposition, P. 230, L. 11-19.)
Both before and after contracting with the Caravellas to complete the construction of the
Home, Hom communicated with the Caravellas primarily by email. (Findings # 161, p. 347. ) None
ofthe numerous emails make any overt reference to FDG or its assumed business name, Open Range
Homes. (See generally, Defendants' Exhibits A through E, and H through N.) The only connection
to FDG in the emails is in the domain portion of the email address, which was
"builder@openrangehomes.com."
The district court believed Horn's testimony that there were signs at his job sites that referred
to Open Range Homes. (Findings #45, p. 327.) The court found that "Caravellas should have seen
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the signage at the job site" when they visited the Property. There was no evidence, however,
regarding where the sign was placed, how big it was, or whether it was even legible after being out
in the elements for nearly two years. (See, generally, Tr. Vol. I, P. 235-237.) The Caravellas
testified that they did not see it. (Findings #45.) Hom did not present any evidence that he
affirmatively disclosed his capacity as an agent for FDG or anyone other than himself.
Hom repeatedly represented to the Caravellas that he was the one who had built other homes
in the area and that he was the one who would perform work or would hire subcontractors to perform
work on their house. For example, he stated:
a.

"[Myers] hired me to build the house ... ", (March 17 email,
Ex. A, p. 3) (emphasis added);

b.

"I have one 6000 SF house under construction for a Seattle
guy ... ", (Id.) (emphasis added);

c.

"[can fix just about anything with interior design .... Ml!.
personal cabinet maker sets up shop in your garage .... NO
other builder can touch mr. cabinets and !!.D!. guy only works
for me." (March 21 email, Ex. D, p. 6-7) (emphases added);

d.

"Okay, mr. stone mason can start next week. . .. Once I get
going, I will send you a drawing of where I think you might
want to add more stone." (Ex. 22 p. 2) (emphasis added);

e.

"I normally bill on or about the 15 th of each month ...."
(May 16 email, Ex. D, bottom paragraph) (emphasis added).

The first overt reference to FDG or Open Range Homes that was ever given to the Caravellas
was an invoice from FDG dated May 19, 2008, for construction materials purchased for the Home.
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(Ex. 89a). This obviously occurred after the contract was formed and work had begun on the Home.
(See Ex. N (email regarding delivery of the materials on May 16, 2008).)

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Whether the District Court erred in Concluding that Michael Hom did not know his

material representations to the Caravellas were false.

R

Whether the District Court erred in failing to conclude that Hom is personally liable

as the agent of an undisclosed principal.
C.

Whether the District Court erred in failing to conclude that Hom is personally liable

for the judgment entered against FDG on the grounds of alter ego.

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Caravellas request that this Court award them reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, as it arises from a
commercial transaction and contract for services. The Caravellas hired HornJFDG in a "commercial
transaction" to provide construction-related materials and services. Under section 12-120(3), the
prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees in an action to recover on a contract "relating to the
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction." The
Caravellas should be awarded their reasonable attorney fees on appeal because the gravamen ofthe
fraud claims and the claims of Hom's personal liability arose from Hom's efforts to secure the
contract to provide construction-related goods and services, his misrepresentations about such
contract, and his performance of such contract. This matter is both a "commercial transaction," Lee
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v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 189 P.3d 467 (2008), and a contract for services. See Brian & Christie,
Inc. v. Leishman Electric, LLC, 150 Idaho 22, 244 P.3d 166 (2010) (holding that the economic loss
rule does not apply to services contracts, and that electrician's work constitutes services, but fees
were not sought on appeal under 12-120(3)). The construction contract is integral to the Caravellas'
claims of fraud and to Horn's personal liability.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

STANDARDOFREVIEW
"The party alleging intentional misrepresentation or fraud has the burden of proving the

elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence." Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 225, 46
P.3d 518,521 (2002), citing G &M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,808 P.2d 851
(1991). "When reviewing the trial court's findings of fact in a case in which the facts must be
established by clear and convincing evidence, the job of the reviewing court is simply to determine
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to sustain the finding." Sowards v. Rathbun,
134 Idaho 702, 707,8 P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000); Lindberg, 137 Idaho at 225,46 P.3d at 521; Carney

v. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275,985 P.2d 1137 (1999). "This Court exercises free review over the district
judge's conclusions oflaw." Id., citing Carneyv. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 278, 985 P.2d 1137,1140

(1999), andMarshallv. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975,979 (1997). "This Court's review
of a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings offact
and whether the findings offact support the conclusions oflaw." Sowards, 134 Idaho at 706,8 P.3d
at 1249.
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In this case, most of the Caravellas' contentions of error are based on the district court's
application of its own findings of fact to the conclusions of law. Therefore, the standard of review
is de novo. The Caravellas submit that the district court's findings of fact and the Record support
conclusions oflaw that Hom committed fraud and is personally liable to the Caravellas.

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS DEMONSTRATE THAT CARAVELLAS
PROVED THE SCIENTER ELEMENT OF FRAUD
The Caravellas respectfully submit that the district court erred in failing to conclude that they

proved all the elements of fraud. The prima facie case of fraud consists of:
(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it
should be acted on by the person and in the manner reasonably
contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance
on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; (9) his consequent and
proximate injury.

Faw v, Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 389, 613 P.2d 1338, 1340 (1980) (emphasis added). Accord,
e.g., Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 127, 106 P.3d 449, 453 (2005);
Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 89, 996 P.2d 303, 308 (2000); and
Zuhlke v. Anderson Buick, Inc., 94 Idaho 634, 635, 496 P.2d 95,96 (1972).
The district court concluded that the Caravellas proved all but the fourth element of fraud,
i.e., Horn/FDG's "knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth," with regard to the following
categories of misrepresentations:
a.
b.

the condition, quality and value of the Home and workmanship of the
construction performed on the Home before they purchased it;
the progress and quality of work FDG performed on the project
pursuant to his contract with them; and
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c.

the cost of materials used in the construction.

(R. Vol. II, P. 355, Conclusions #42) (emphases added).4
The district court's conclusion that the Caravellas failed to prove Horn's knowledge of the
falsity of his statements with regard to the three described types of misrepresentations is wholly at
odds with the district court's express findings of fact. In other instances, the only reasonable
conclusions that can be drawn from the district court's aggregate findings are either that it was
impossible for Horn not to have known his representations were false or that he made statements of
affirmative fact when he was "ignorant of its truth." Therefore, Caravellas respectfully request that
this Court review de novo the application of the "found" facts to the Caravellas' fraud claims, and
conclude that they have proven the final element of fraud and are entitled to judgment against FDG
and Horn personally for fraud.
1.

Caravellas Proved that Horn/FDG Knew or Should Have Known that Horn's
Statements Regarding the Value, Condition, Quality and Workmanship of the
Home Prior to Purchase Were False.

The district court correctly concluded that the Caravellas proved eight elements of fraud
arising from HornlFDG' s misrepresentations about "the condition, quality and value ofthe home and
workmanship of the construction performed on the home before they purchased it." (R. Vol. II, P.
355, Conclusion #42 (a)) (emphases added). The district courterred,however, inconcludingthatthe

There is no appeal or cross-appeal challenging the district court's conclusion that eight
of the nine elements of fraud were proved. Therefore, the only issue on appeal with regard to
fraud is whether the Caravellas also proved the scienter, or "speaker's knowledge," element.
4
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Caravellas did not prove the fourth element of fraud, that misrepresentations were knowingly made,
because such conclusion is belied by the court's findings of fact.

a.

Value of Home

At the outset, Hom's prior dealings with Myers and First Horizon strongly demonstrate his
general disregard for the truth and his intent to deceive those for whom he is working. (Findings
#137, p. 343.) His early encouragement to the Caravellas that they defraud Chase bank is further
evidence of his pattern of deceit. (Findings #31, p. 325.)
It is impossible for Hom not to have known that he had been paid only $656,173 for the

initial construction for Myers. It is equally impossible for him not to have known that the numerous,
substantial items of work he certified as complete to Myers and First Horizon were never in fact
incorporated into the Home's construction, and thus that the actual amount of funds actually used
in the Home's construction was at least $87,000 less than he was paid, thus no more than $570,000.
When the time came that the Caravellas were interested in the Property, Hom had a personal
financial interest in the sale because his wife was the selling real estate agent. (Findings #26, p. 32425.) Also, it appears that Hom also intended to record his untimely, unfounded lien for $23,000,
which was paid out of the closing funds. (Findings #36-37, p. 325.) In furtherance of his financial
interests, Hom knowingly mis-represented to the Caravellas numerous times that "$800,000 worth
of construction had been completed," nearly one and one-half (1 'ii) times the amount he knew had
actually been completed. (Findings #28, p. 324.)
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"[W]here actual value is known and false statements are knowingly made with intention to
deceive, and do deceive the parties to whom they are made, such statements constitute actionable
fraud. Such statements are not expressions of opinion but are statements of material facts." Jordan

v. Hunter, 124 Idaho 899,907 (Ct. App.1993), citingFoxv. Cosgrith, 66 Idaho 371,380,159 P.2d
224, 227 (1945). "Thus, where a speaker gives an opinion when he is aware of facts incompatible
with such opinion, the opinion may amount to a false statement of fact if made with the intention of
deceiving or misleading." !d., citing Fox, 66 Idaho at 380-81, 159 P.2d at 227-28; 37 Am. Jur. 2d

Fraud and Deceit § 49.
Caravellas respectfully submit that a correct application ofthe district court's own findings
of fact mandates a conclusion that Horn was fully aware that he had misrepresented the actual value
of the Property. Therefore, the Caravellas proved the fourth element of fraud with regard to this
issue, for which the district court concluded they had proved the other eight elements of fraud.
Because the Caravellas relied on Horn's misrepresentations in their decision to purchase the
Property, (R. Vol. I, p. 325, Findings #33-34), they should be entitled to ajudgment for fraud against
both Horn personally and FDG for all damages that flowed from such purchase. Those damages
should include the eventual costs of repair, overbilling and attorney fees awarded by the district court
against FDG, as well as the difference between Horn's representation ofthe amount of construction
that had been completed and the actual amount of completed construction.
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b.

Condition & Quality of the Home, and Workmanship of Construction

The district court rightly found that Hom had no actual experience performing any aspect of
construction work, and the evidence clearly shows that he had very little experience even as a
"hands-off' general contractor or construction manager of residential construction. Nevertheless,
Hom took it upon himselfto inspect the partially-constructed home with the Caravellas, and "Hom
knew that Caravellas were relying upon his assessment of the home's condition. " (Conclusions #37,
p. 354.) In doing so, Hom minimized the problems in the Home and affirmatively represent to the
Caravellas that, other than two specific structural issues, the Home was "structurally sound" and "in
great shape." (Findings #41-42, p. 326.) The district court concluded that "the Caravellas relied
heavily upon Hom's representations as to the condition of the home. In lieu of bringing in an outside
inspector, Caravellas relied upon the builder [Hom] who would be completing the home to confirm
its condition." (Conclusions #37, p. 354.)
It is obvious from the nearly innumerable construction defects later found in the Home that

Hom knew almost nothing about the workmanship, condition or quality of construction. Not having
any actual experience or expertise, Hom had no business making affirmative representations to the
Caravellas regarding any of those things. This is especially true in light of the fact that Hom had
gone to great lengths to convince the Caravellas that he was actually a highly skilled, well respected
builder. Of special concern is the fact that Hom, with his lack oftraining or experience, took it upon
himselfto redesign a portion of the roof without any architect or engineering input. (Findings #108,
p. 338.) Certainly, Hom knew there was at least the potential of a structural issue, but he failed to
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disclose this fact to the Caravellas. Rather, he affinnativeiy represented that the Home was
"structurally sound."
The district court erroneously concluded that Hom did not intentionally deceive the
Caravellas, but that he was merely incompetent. (Conclusions #44, p. 355.) To establish fraud,
however, it is not necessary to show actual deceptive intent. "Circumstances inconsistent with an
honest, reasonable belief in the truth of the statements, or indicating a reckless disregard for the
truth" are sufficient to establish the scienter element offraud. Parker v. Herron, 30 Idaho 327, 331,
164P.1013, 1014(1917). See also, e.g., General Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho
849, 854, 979 P.2d 1207, 1212 (1999) (in punitive damages context, describing "reckless
indifference to the rights ofthe other party" as fraud).
Decisions from federal courts are in accord with Idaho case law. "[T]he scienter requirement
in the tort of misrepresentation generally has been interpreted to include recklessness." In re

Houtman, 568 F.2d 651, 656 (9th Cir. 1978), citing W. Prosser, Torts, § 701 (4th Ed. 1971).
"[I]ntent to deceive may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, including reckless
disregard for the truth." Gertsch v. Johnson & Johnson, Fin. Corp. (In re Gertsch), 237 B.R. 160,
167-68 (9th Cir. BAP 1999). Accord, National Union Fire Ins. Co., Pa. v. Bonnanzio (In re

Bonnanzio), 91 F.3d 296,301 (2d Cir. 1996); Norris v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Norris), 70 F.3d 27,
30 (5th Cir. 1996); Insurance Co. of N Am. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir.
1995); In re Miller, 39 F.3d 301, 305 (1Ith Cir. 1994); Martin v. Bank of Germantown (In re

Martin), 761 F.2d 1163, 1167 (6th Cir. 1985).
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At 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit § 120 (2012), it is explained that
False statements that are made recklessly, without knowing or caring
whether they are true or false, will support an action of fraud or
deceit. Accordingly, the scienter or intent to deceive requirement, for
purposes of a fraud claim, can be satisfied by a showing of
recklessness. A representation is 'reckless' ifit is made without any
knowledge of the truth, or if the person making the representation
knows that he or she does not have sufficient information or a basis
to support it, or if the maker realizes that he or she does not know
whether or not the statement is true.

Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphases added). The pertinent section of the Restatement is consistent,
explaining that misrepresentation is fraudulent ifthe maker "knows that he does not have the basis
for his representation that he states or implies." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 526(c).
Case law from other states consistently hold that an unqualified assertion of a fact susceptible
of defendant's knowledge is regarded as an assertion of that knowledge, and is
fraudulent ifthe defendant does not actually have such knowledge. Kirkpatrick v. Reeves, 22 N.B.
139 (Ind. 1889); Smart & Perry Ford Sales, Inc. v. Weaver, 274N.E.2d 718 (Ind.App.1971);Bullitt

v. Farrar, 43 N.W. 566 (Minn. 1889); Providence State Bank v. Bohannon, 426 F.Supp. 886
(E.D.Mo.1977); Schlossman's v. Niewinski, 79 A.2d 870 (N.J. 1951); Manning v. Len Immke Buick,

Inc., 276 N.E.2d 253 (Ohio App.1971); Liner v. Armstrong Homes o/Bremerton, Inc., 579 P.2d 367
(Wash.App. 1978); First Nat. Banko/Tigerton v. Hackett, 149 N.W. 703 (Wis. 1914).
37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit § 122 (2012), explains that matters of opinion, estimate, or
judgment can support a finding of fraud. A person is gUilty of fraud if the speaker
makes such a positive and unqualified statement as implies
knowledge on the speaker's part, when in fact the speaker has no
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knowledge on the subject ... if the statement proves to be false ...
[and] where the assertion is in respect of a matter that is definitely
ascertainable, as distinguished from a matter of opinion, estimate, or
judgment. . .. [A]n opinion may constitute fraud if the speaker
knows it is false.
Id. (footnotes omitted). "[AJ representation recklessly made, without knowing whether or not it is
true, cannot be a statement honestly believed but, on the contrary, is regarded as a false statement
knowingly made." 37 AmJur2dFraudandDeceit§ 121 (20]2).
Even if Horn was not fully aware of the actual poor condition, quality and workmanship of
the Home, he knew or should have known that he had no reasonable basis to make any affirmations
to the Caravellas regarding such condition, quality or workmanship of the Home. Again, Horn led
the Caravellas to believe that he was highly skilled, garnered their trust in his expert opinion, and
without any reasonable basis told them that the highly defective construction was in fact "sound" and
"in good shape."
The Caravellas proved facts, found by the district court, which demonstrate that Horn either
knew his statements were false or, if not, he was "ignoran[t] of its truth." Faw v. Greenwood, 101
Idaho at 389, 613 P.2d at 1340. Horn's indifference and reckless disregard for the actual truth
requires a conclusion that he made misrepresentations to the Caravellas with "knowledge of its
falsity or in ignorance of its truth." Id. Therefore, Caravellas should be entitled to a judgment for
fraud against both Horn and FDG for all the damages that flowed from their purchase of the
Property. Succinctly stated, the district court's findings of fact regarding Horn's representations
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concerning his experience and competence as a builder, combined with his statements of fact
regarding the quality and extent of construction establish the fourth element of fraud, i.e., scienter.

2.

Caravellas Proved that Horn/FDG Knew or Should Have Known That Horn's
Statements Regarding the Progress and Quality of the Work Performed
Pursuant to the Contract with Them Were False.

The second type of misrepresentation for which the district court concluded the Caravellas
had proved "eight out of nine elements offraud" concerned "the progress and quality of work FDG
performed on the proj ect pursuant to his contract with them." (R. Vol. II, P. 355, Conclusion#42(b))
(emphasis added).
"Insofar as the element of knowledge is concerned, false representations may be ground for
relief where the person making them ought to know ... or the person has the means of knowing the
truth. The rule applies even though the party making the statements does not know that they are
false. . .. An innocent misrepresentation of fact may be actionable if the declarant has the means
of knowing, ought to know, or has the duty of knowing the truth." 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit

§ 119 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
The district court expressly found that Hom represented to the Caravellas that major, critical
portions of the work had been completed according to the plans when, in fact, such work was neither
completed nor did it conform to the plans. Those items include the exterior stone work, (Findings
#66, p. 330; #111-12, p. 338-39); the exterior siding, (Findings #72-73, p. 331); garage and "bam"
doors, (Findings #82-83, p. 333); and ridge vents and flashing on the roof, (Findings #71, p. 331).
Hom billed the Caravellas for more than the full agreed contract price for those items, which he
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knew, or ought to have known, were not actually even completed. Certainly, Hom had the means
of knowing or learning the truth, as the general contractor. Unlike the Caravellas, who were in Ohio
and relying on Hom to perform the contract honestly, Hom lived only a few miles away from the
jobsite.

Hom was obligated to confirm that the work was completed before affirmatively

representing to the Caravellas that it was complete, and an equal or greater obligation to confirm its
completion before billing the Caravellas for the work.
With regard to the slander of title claim, the district court expressly found that "HornlFDG
and Yellowstone should have known that they substantially overbilled the Caravellas for the work
and materials actually provided," that they "displayed a cavalier indifference to accepted accounting
and inventory control procedures," and that they "demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of their sworn statements" regarding the work and materials actually provided to the
Caravellas. (Conclusions #55, p. 358.) Hom ought to have known that the work was actually
incomplete, but misrepresented that fact to the Caravellas. As a result, the Caravellas continued to
make payments to Hom, and even paid more than the contract price.
The Caravellas respectfully submit that they should be awarded damages for fraud against
both Hom and FDG, which should include their costs to repair and complete the work contracted
by Hom, as well as the amounts they paid in excess of the contract price.
3.

Horn/FDG Knew or Should Have Known He Was Overbilling Caravellas for

the Authorized Work Performed on the Home.
The third type of misrepresentation for which the district court concluded the Caravellas had
proved "eight out of nine elements of fraud" concerned "the cost of materials used in the

26

construction." (R. Vol. IT, P. 355, Conclusion #42(c).) This issue raises the same legal principals
addressed above.
The total contract price was only $88,500, but the Caravellas were billed, and paid,
$138,097.24. (Findings #131, p. 342.) Even ifthe unauthorized concrete ($19,900), garage doors
($16,395), and other allowed charges were added to the contract price, the very most the Caravellas
possibly owed to HornlFDG was $126,646.79. (Id.) Again, the Court expressly concluded that
"HornlFDG and Yellowstone should have known that they substantially overbilled the Caravellas
for the work and materials actually provided," that they "displayed a cavalier indifference to accepted
accounting and inventory control procedures," and that they "demonstrated a reckless disregard for
the truth or falsity oftheir sworn statements" regarding the work and materials actually provided to
the Caravellas. (Conclusions #55, p. 358.) The fact that HornlFDG recorded a mechanics lien for
an additional amount claimed due in excess of$1 05,000 further demonstrates Hom's utter disregard
for the truth regarding his billing. Additionally, the district court specifically found that "FDG and
Hom's prior dealings with Myers and First Horizon also showed a pattern of billing for materials
that were never used in constructing the home." (Findings # 13 7, p. 343.) It was impossible for Hom
not to have known that Caravellas were being billed over $243,000 for work he had agreed to
perform for $88,500, an increase of nearly three times the contract price.
The referenced findings of facts and related conclusions oflaw are wholly inconsistent with
a conclusion that the Caravellas failed to prove the scienter element of fraud, i.e., Hom's "knowledge
of its falsity or ignorance of its truth," with regard to overbilling. Faw, 101 Idaho at 389,613 P.2d
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at 1340. "Circumstances inconsistent with an honest, reasonable beliefin the truth ofthe statements,
or indicating a reckless disregard {or the truth" are sufficient to establish the scienter element of

fraud. Parker, 30 Idaho at 331,164 P. at 1014 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., GeneralAuto Parts

Co., 132 Idaho at 854, 979 P.2d at 1212 (in punitive damages context, describing "reckless
indifference to the rights of the other party" as fraud). Certainly, Hom's prior conduct with respect
to Myers and First Horizon, which the district court expressly found to show "a pattern of billing for
materials that were never used," (Findings #137, p. 343), is evidence of motive and intent State v.
Sanchez, 94 Idaho 125, 128,483 P.2d 173, 176 (1971).

Caravellas respectfully request that this Court reverse the district court's dismissal of the
fraud claims and order entry of a judgment in favor of the Caravellas for all damages flowing from
Hom's fraudulent conduct. Ultimately, Hom's fraudulent conduct gave rise to all ofthe Caravellas'
damages incurred as a result of their purchase of the Home and hiring of Hom to complete the
construction.

C.

HORN IS PERSONALLY LIABLE BECAUSE HE ENTERED THE CONTRACT
WITH CARAVELLAS AS THE AGENT FOR AN UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL
The district court believed that Hom's personal liability was "admittedly a close question"

that the Court "wrestled with for some time." (Findings #163, p. 347.) Nevertheless, the district
court concluded that Hom did not "actively [attempt] to conceal FDG's role" from the Caravellas,
(Findings #163, p. 347; Conclusions #59, p. 359), and that "the e-mail address (used on all
correspondence), the signage on the job site, and the letterhead on the invoices, adequately evidenced
FDG's role in this transaction." (/d.)
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"It is a basic principle that an agent who enters into a contract on behalf of a corporation, but
who neither discloses his agency nor the existence of that corporation to the third party, is personally
liable to the third party." McCluskey Commissary, Inc. v. Sullivan, 96 Idaho 91, 93, 524 P.2d 1063,
1065 (1974). "A principal is 'disclosed' if, at the time of making the contract in question, the other
party to it has notice that the agent is acting for a principal and of the principal's identity." General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, Inc., 96 Idaho 691,697,535 P.2d 664,670 (1975)
(emphasis added). The Court of Appeals applied the holding from General Motors to conclude that
"[a]n agent contracting with someone else is liable as a party to the contract unless he discloses, at
or before the time of entering into the contract, the agency relationship and the identity of the
principal." Western Seeds v. Bartu, 109 Idaho 70, 71, 704 P.2d 974, 975 (Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis
added). 5
According to the Restatement (Third) of Agency, both the agent and his principal are liable
parties to the contract if the principal is not disclosed before the contract is made:
When an agent acting with actual authority makes a contract on
behalf of an undisclosed principal,
(1) unless excluded by the contract, the principal is a party to
the contract;
(2) the agent and the third party are parties to the contract; and
(3) the principal, if a party to the contract, and the third party
have the same rights, liabilities, and defenses against each

5 "Similarly, a person contracting with another for a partially disclosed principal is liable
as a party to the contract." Western Seeds, 109 Idaho at 71, 704 P.2d at 975, citing Keller
Lorenz Co. v. Insurance Assoc. Corp., 98 Idaho 678,570 P.2d 1366 (1977).
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other as ifthe principal made the contract personally, subject
to §§ 6.05-6.09.
Restatement (Third) Agency, § 6.03.
hnportantly, the burden of showing that the principal was disclosed before the agreement was
made is on the party asserting the existence of the agency, i.e., Hom. Marco Distributing, Inc. v.

Biehl, 97 Idaho 853,858,555 P.2d 393, 398 (1976). See Keller Lorenz Co. v. Ins. Assocs. Corp.,
98 Idaho 678, 681, 570 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Idaho 1977) (a party's role as agent is an affirmative
defense that must be proved by the party asserting the agency).
The Caravellas asserted in their counterclaim their understanding that they had contracted
with Hom personally, and not with FDG or any other company. CR. Vol. I, P. 122-35.) Homdidnot
assert any affirmative defense that he had been acting as an agent for FDG. In Finding of Fact #45,
the Court wrote:
Caravellas testified that they believed they were dealing with
Hom personally, not on behalf of an entity, such as FDG. However,
Hom testified credibly that his e-mail address and signage at the
home site provided notice from the start that they were dealing with
"Frontier Development, LLC dba Open Range Homes." Later,
Caravellas sent at least five payments to Hom via checks made
payable to "Frontier Development Group, LLC."
(R. Vol. I, P. 327.) The district court also found that "even ifCaravellas did not initially know, they
essentially acquiesced to the arrangement by continuing to make payments directly to FDG, rather
than to Hom." (Findings #162, p. 347; Conclusions #59, p. 359.) The district court further found
that the Caravellas "could have terminated the relationship early on because the project was clearly
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intended to be divided into separate and distinct phases." (Findings #162, p. 347.) In its
corresponding Conclusions of Law #59, the district court wrote:
The names of "Frontier Development Group" and/or "Open Range
Homes" were present on every correspondence, invoice, and the
signage at the job site. The Court concludes that there was no
evidence that Horn attempted to conceal the LLC from Caravellas.
When Caravellas began making payments, they did so by making
checks directly payable to FDG or Open Range Homes without
complaint, reservation, or objection. The Court must conclude that
Caravellas acquiesced to the fact they were dealing with an entity, and
not Horn personally.
(R. Vol. II, P. 359) (emphasis added).
The district court's findings and conclusions illustrate two related, fundamental errors in the
its analysis. First, the court appears to have placed the burden of proof on the Caravellas with regard
to Horn's un-plead affirmative defense. When a party asserts that he is not personally liable because
he acted only as an agent for a principal, such as a corporation, he bears the burden to prove such
facts as an affirmative defense. Keller Lorenz Co. v. Ins. Assocs. Corp., 98 Idaho 678, 681,570 P.2d
1366, 1369 (Idaho 1977). Accord, Welch v. Laraway, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3041, at 10 (Bankr. D.
Idaho Sept. 13,2010) (Attached hereto as Addendum 1) ("The party asserting agency as a defense
to personal liability on a contract bears the burden of showing that the principal was adequately
disclosed. "). Since the burden of proof was on Horn, not the Caravellas, the lack of evidence that
Horn attempted to conceal the company's existence is not the evidentiary standard. Rather, Horn
was required to prove that he made an affirmative effort to disclose the company's existence "at or
befOre the time of entering into the contract." Western Seeds, 109 Idaho at 71, 704 P.2d at 975.
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An official comment to Restatement (Third) Agency § 6.03 explains that it is incumbent on
the agent to provide sufficient notice of his agency relationship, and it is not a third party's duty to
discover the principal's existence:
A principal is undisclosed if, at the time a contract is made, the third
party with whom the agent deals has no notice that the agent is acting
on behalf of a principal. It is a question of fact whether the third party
has received sufficient notice that the contract is made with an agent
who represents a principal and sufficient notice of that principal's
identity. The third party is not subject to a duty to discover the
principal's existence or identity; the responsibility is the agent's if the
agent wishes to avoid personal liability on the contract. However, a
third party may have sufficient notice of the principal's existence or
identity from sources apart from the agent.

!d. at cmt. 3 (emphases added).
There was no evidence that Hom made any effort to inform the Caravellas that they were
dealing with FDG, as opposed to him personally. "[TJhe managing officer of a corporation, even
though acting for the company, becomes liable as a principal where he deals with one ignorant of
the company's existence and of his relation to it and fails to inform the latter of the facts." Interlode

Constructors v. Bryant, 132 Idaho 443, 446-447, 974 P.2d 89, 93 (Ct. App. 1999), citing Marco
Distributing, Inc. v. Biehl, 97 Idaho 853,858,555 P.2d 393, 398 (1976). "It is a basic principle that
an agent who enters into a contract on behalf of a corporation, but who neither discloses his agency
nor the existence ofthe corporation to the third party, becomes personally liable to that third party."

!d., citing McCluskey Commisary, Inc., 96 Idaho at 93,524 P.2d at 1065. Hom's failure to produce
evidence of any affirmative disclosure to the Caravellas that he was acting as an agent for FDG, as
well as the lack of any evidence that the Caravellas were actually aware of such fact, requires a
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conclusion that Hom should be treated as a party to the construction contract, and is therefore liable
for his and FDG's breach ofthe contract.
The second error in the court's findings and conclusions is that the identification of Frontier
Development Group, LLC, on the invoices after work had begun, cured the prior non-disclosure and
relieved Hom from all liability. The authorities are clear, however, that in order to avoid liability,
an agent for a principal must disclose the identity of the principal "at or befOre the time of entering
into the contract." Western Seeds, 109 Idaho at 71, 704 P.2d at 975. Since the invoices paid by the
Caravellas obviously were delivered only after the fact, they cannot serve as a basis for relieving
Hom from liability.
The Court's reference to the parties' intention that the construction be performed in "separate
and distinct phases," thus allowing the Caravellas to terminate the relationship early in the project,
(Findings # 162, p. 347), fails to account for the fact that Hom never actually completed even the first
phase of the construction. Even if the contract is divisible by phases, Hom would be personally
liable for at least the first phase. In this particular instance, all of the Caravellas' damages flow from
Hom's performance, or failure of performance, with regard to the first phase. Thus, even under the
district court's reasoning, Hom should be found liable.
Hom admitted in his testimony that except for a single face-to-face meeting with the
Caravellas at the Property before they purchased the Home, all of their communications prior to
beginning work on the contract were done through email. (Tr. VoL I, P. 402, L. 12-21.) None of
the numerous emails make any reference to FDG. (See generally, Defendants' Exhibits A through
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E, and H through N.) The only connection to FDG is the inclusion of its trade name in the domain
portion ofthe email address: ..builder@openrangehomes.com ... The district court's reliance on the
email domain name should not stand as sufficient evidence to establish notice that a person using
such email address is acting as an agent. Otherwise, it could be presumed that anyone receiving an
email from a person using an "msn.com" email address.or ..cableone.net.....yahoo.com... or other
common email domain names, is on notice that the person sending the email is an agent for
Microsoft, Cable One, or Yahoo. Certainly, there are many, many domain names less familiar than
those listed. Obviously, the vast majority of such users have no agency relationship with those
companies. It is unreasonable and overly burdensome to charge an email recipient with knowledge
or a duty to distinguish between actual agents and other users of an email domain name, and is
inconsistent with the general principles cited above that place the burden of disclosure on the agent.
It is unreasonable to.

Regarding the in-person visit, Hom did not present any evidence that he affirmatively
disclosed that he was acting on behalf of any company rather than himself, although he testified that
there were signs on the Property identifying "Open Range Homes" as the builder. (Tr. Vol. I, P. 235237.) There was no evidence, however, regarding where the sign was placed, how big it was, or
whether it was even legible after purportedly being in place for nearly two years. (Id.) The
Caravellas testified that they did not see the sign. (Findings #45, p. 327.)
In Welch, the plaintiffs had contacted a general contractor, Laraway, about building a home
for them.

2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3041, at 2.

The written construction contract identified the
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contracting builder as "Diamond Ridge Construction," Laraway's company. Attached to the contract
were plans and specifications prepared by "Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc." Id. When both
Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc., and Laraway, individually, filed bankruptcy, the plaintiff
homeowners brought an action in bankruptcy court against Laraway for personal liability arising
from alleged breaches of the construction contract. Judge Meyers concluded that the reference to
Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc., in the plans and specifications was insufficient to establish
adequate notice to the homeowners. Id. at 11-12. The court explained: "The burden was on Laraway
to conspicuously inform the We1ches that the contracting party was Diamond Ridge Construction,
Inc. ifhe desired to invoke the liability protections afforded by the corporate structure." Id. at 12,
citing Interlode Constructors, 132 Idaho 443,974 P.2d at 92-93.
The court in Welch also considered evidence found outside the construction contract,
including a "Client Introduction Packet," which referenced the company, given to the homeowners
at their first meeting, and a contractors' license hanging on the wall of Laraway's office, but there
was no evidence that the homeowners actually saw or understood those references to the company.
The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish notice that the contracting party
was the corporation: "The onus was on Laraway to clearly indicate to the We1ches, before or at the
time of the Contract, that he was acting as the agent of Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc .... His
failure to do so left him exposed to personal liability on the Contract. Id.at 12-13, citing Interlode
Constructors, 132 Idaho 443, 974 P.2d at 92-93.
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This case is strikingly similar to Welch. There is no evidence that Hom affirmatively
informed the Caravellas that he was acting for FDG. The only evidence from which the Caravellas
possibly could have inferred that Hom was acting for FDG was the purported sign and the last half
of Hom's email address. The Caravellas testified that they did not see the sign, and there is no
evidence that the email domain name was noticed by the Caravellas or that they comprehended Hom
was acting on behalf of "Open Range Homes," before work began on the project. There is no
material difference between the signs and references to the company in Welch, and the claimed sign
and email address in this case. Parroting, Judge Meyers, "The onus was on [Hom] to clearly indicate
to the [Caravellas], before or at the time ofthe Contract, that he was acting as the agent of "Frontier
Development Group, LLC." Hom should therefore be held personally liable on the contract.

D.

THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE CONCLUDED THAT FDG WAS AN
"ALTER EGO" OF HORN AND "PIERCED THE CORPORATE VEIL"
The district court found that Hom "may not have rigorously followed all formalities one

working through an entity should generally follow," but concluded that "his conduct was sufficient
to merit the protection afforded to the participants in a limited liability company." (Findings #163,
p. 347; Conclusions #59, p. 359.) The district court reasoned that "[a]1though Hom had complete
control over the actions and finances ofFDG, and treated its profits as his own personal income, this
alone does not invalidate the LLC." (Conclusions #59, p. 359.) The only facts relied upon by the
court in support of its conclusion that Hom should not be held personally liable were Hom's
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unsupported testimony that FDG owned two forklifts 6 during the Caravella project and that the
corporate or assumed business names were on signage, correspondence and invoices. (Id.)
"It is the general rule that the conditions under which a corporate entity may be disregarded

vary according to the circumstances of each case." Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary,
95 Idaho 599, 601,514 P.2d 594, 596 (1973). In order for a corporation to be an alter ego of an
individual, there must be (1) "a unity of interest and ownership to a degree that the separate
personalities ofthe corporation and individual no longer exist" and (2) "ifthe acts are treated as acts
of the corporation an inequitable result would follow" or would "sanction a fraud or promote
injustice." Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc., 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165
P.3d 261,271 (2007); Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., 141 Idaho 604,616 (2005); Sirius LC v. Erickson,
150 Idaho 80, 85,244 P.3d 224, 229 (2010).
The Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, enacted in 2008, is based on the Revised
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act ("RULLCA"). Idaho Code § 30-6-101. The Caravellas
recognize that Idaho § Code 30-6-304(2) specifically relieves LLCs from the requirementto "observe
any particular formalities relating to the exercise of its powers or management of its activities" in
order to avoid "imposing liability on the members or managers for the debts, obligations or other

6 Hom did not identify any other FDG assets in his testimony at trial. (Tr. Vol. II, P. 910,
L. 24 through P. 911, L. 10.) In Hom's deposition testimony, admitted into evidence as Exhibit
DDDD, he claimed that FDG owned only one forklift, not two, and no other assets. (Exhibit
DDDD, Hom Deposition, P. 230, L. 11-19.)
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liabilities of the company." ld. However, the statute eliminates only one of the factors in the
"piercing" analysis with regard to LLCs.
Even though corporate formalities are not required, the members of an LLC must still
maintain the company's separate economic identity. The official comment for subsection (b) of the
RULLCA- subsection (2) in Idaho Code § 30-6-304-- explains that "[t]he doctrine of 'piercing
the corporate veil' is well-established, and courts regularly (and sometimes almost reflexively) apply
that doctrine to limited liability companies." Idaho Code § 30-6-304(2), official cmt. to subsection
(b) [(2)] (2008) (emphases added). "This subsection does not preclude consideration of another
key piercing factor -- disregard by an entity's owners ofthe entity's economic separateness from
the owners." ld. The official comment provided the following example:
EXAMPLE: The sole owner of a limited liability company
uses a car titled in the company's name for personal purposes and
writes checks on the company's account to pay for personal expenses.
These facts are relevant to a piercing claim; they pertain to economic
separateness, not subsection (b) [(2)] formalities.
The district court expressly found, based on Horn's admissions at trial, that "FDG acts only
through him, never hired any employees, did not own any assets at the time of trial, and that all of
FDG's profits were taken by him as his personal income, although he does not receive any
compensation as a manager or employee of FDG." (Findings #157, p. 346.) In his testimony, Horn
explained:
A- At the time of this project, Frontier Development Group was 50
percent to my wife, Kathleen Horn, and 50 percent to myself.
Q- Did she have any involvement -38

A- Absolutely none.

Q- Did you pay yourself as the managing member from Frontier
Development?
A- I did not receive a salary per se. You'd have to clarify your
question.

Q- How did you -- did you cut separate checks from Frontier
Development to pay yourself or did you just take dividends or how
did you accomplish it?
A- I didn't really take an income out ofthe company itself. It was just
income coming in and then -- no, I didn't pay myself out of Frontier
Development Group, no.
Q- So you didn't cut a separate managing member's salary or
anything like that? It's just whatever money came in and was left over
at the end you -- was your income?
A- Yes.
(Tr. Vol. II, P. 910, L. 1-23) (emphasis added). Hom further testified that the only way Frontier
Development could act was through him. (Tr. Vol. IT, P. 912, L. 16-18; P. 913, L. 1-3.)
The Caravellas submit that Hom' s absolute control over FDG, combined with treating FDG's
income as his own personal income demonstrates a unity of interest sufficient to satisfy the first
element of the alter ego analysis. While he did not write checks from the business account to pay
for personal expenses, he also admitted that FDG did not give him any paychecks or dividends. The
money simply was his to use. There simply is no material difference between spending a company's
money using its checkbook and spending the company's cash for personal uses. See Idaho Code §
30-6-304(2), official cmt. to subsection (b) [(2)] (2008) (quoted above).
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Under-capitalization is another influencing factor in the "piercing" analysis. Ross v. Coleman
Co., 114 Idaho 817,845, 761 P.2d 1169, 1197 (1988). Considering the fact that HornlFDG was

engaged in the business of building large, high-end homes worth well over a million dollars each,
it cannot be reasonably concluded that ownership of one or, at most, two forklifts is adequate
capitalization of the company. Indeed, there was no evidence regarding the age, type, size or value
of the forklifts. Caravellas respectfully submit that there was insufficient evidence to support the
district court's conclusion that FDG's assets were adequate capital under the circumstances to avoid
piercing the corporate veil.
The district court concluded that "[t]he fact that Hom has now allegedly left FDG with no
means of satisfying a judgment against it does create serious equitable concerns for the Court .... "
(Conclusions #60, p. 359) (emphasis added). This appears to be a conclusion that the second prong
of the alter ego analysis was satisfied. In addition, all of the acts for which FDG has been held liable
to the Caravellas were undertaken by, or under the direction and control of Hom. Hom operated
FDG in such a reckless manner that he wholly ignored the actual contracts he had made with the
Caravellas, and earlier with Myers/First Horizon. Hom was the person who misrepresented material
facts to the Caravellas about the quality, value and condition of the Home, about the progress of the
work, and who overbilled the Caravellas well in excess of both the contract price and the work
actually completed. Hom was the person who wrongfully filed the mechanics lien for which the
Caravellas were awarded substantial damages. Hom took the company's profits as his own income,
and it is only fitting that he should also take the company's losses and liabilities as his own as well.
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Certainly, in inequitable result, which would "sanction a fraud or promote injustice," Maroun, 141
Idaho at 616, will follow if Hom is allowed to engage in such damaging behavior and be allowed
to hide behind such a thin corporate veil.
As for the Caravellas' subsequent knowledge regarding their dealings with FDG, rather than
Hom personally, such knowledge is immaterial to the "piercing" analysis. The case law certainly
does not deny a "piercing" claim simply because the parties were aware that they were dealing with
an LLC. Moreover, the Caravellas submit that the Court's finding that the Caravellas should have
known they were dealing with an LLC is erroneous, as it is not supported by substantial evidence.
The "piercing" analysis accounts for Horn's actions or inactions in operating his company, not the
extent of the Caravellas' knowledge of the company's existence.

In Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 Idaho 286, 293-294, 688 P .2d
1191, 1198-99 (Ct. App. 1984), the Court of Appeals reviewed and remanded a district court's
conclusion that a majority shareholder was not liable as an alter ego. The Court of Appeals'
reasoning demonstrates that facts very similar to Hom's actions are sufficient to establish liability
as an alter ego:
As to the [unity of interest] requirement, we believe there is ample,
undisputed evidence demonstrating unity of interest and ownership.
For example, Ryan's own affidavit dated August 22, 1979 repeatedly
refers to transactions entered into between himself and DCI as if
Clarendon and he were one and the same personality. Also, the
counterclaim of Clarendon and Walker, asserting Clarendon's right to
recover from DCI on certain agreements, makes repeated references
to agreements actually entered into by DCI and Ryan. It is in respect
to these same agreements that DCI contends Clarendon was but the
alter ego of Ryan. Ryan's deposition is part of the record here. In it,
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Ryan was asked about his ownership of Clarendon stock and when he
became a director or officer. He stated, "I always had power of
attorney on everyone and was the major shareholder and the
managing director at all times of this project. So let's get it on the
record, I was the boss." Throughout his deposition Ryan consistently
takes the position that he owns the real estate standing in Clarendon's
name. We are of the opinion that there is sufficient, undisputed
evidence in the record showing a complete unity of interest and
ownership between Ryan and Clarendon, eradicating their separate
personalities so far as the transactions here are concerned. As to the
[inequitable result] requirement, we further hold that to treat Ryan's
promises and agreements in respect to the purchases here involved as
if they were not binding on Clarendon would result in the injustice of
forcing the district court to provide only partial, ineffectual relief and
would greatly extend the litigation necessary to resolve the important
issues in this dispute, exalting form over substance.

Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 Idaho 286,293-294,688 P.2d 1191,
1198-99 (Ct. App. 1984).
Hom was in complete and sole control ofFDG. Hom acted as though he personally owned
all ofFDG's income. In all of Hom's interactions with the Caravellas, particularly before they hired
him to complete the construction of the Home, he referred to himself as the one who built the homes,
hired cabinet makers, designed interiors and who would complete the work for them. Hom made
no reference to FDG until he sent them a billing statement. As a practical matter, FDG the company
did nothing for the Caravellas, and was incapable of doing anything for them, except send them a
bill.
Caravellas respectfully ask this Court to conclude that FDG is the alter ego of Hom, and
Hom is therefore liable for the judgment entered against FDG.
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v.

CONCLUSION

In this appeal, the Caravellas needed only to demonstrate that the district court's express

findings of fact should have led to and support the conclusion that Hom knew his representations
to the Caravellas were false or that he made such misrepresentations in ignorance of the actual truth.
All the other elements of fraud were found by the district court, and such conclusions have not been
challenged on appeal. The Caravellas submit that the express findings offact, as well as additional
supporting evidence, demonstrate Hom's knowledge of his misrepresentations and/or his ignorance
ofthe actual truth. Therefore, the district court's conclusion that Hom is not liable for fraud should
be reversed, and damages awarded to the Caravellas.
Further, the evidence demonstrates that Hom entered into the contract without making any
effort to disclose to the Caravellas that he was acting on behalf of anyone but himself. As an agent
for an undisclosed principal, Hom is liable for breach of contract to the same extent as the principaL
Therefore, Hom is liable to the Caravellas for all their breach of contract damages, and consequently,
for their attorney fees. Finally, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Hom treated FDG as his alter
ego, and should be personally liable for all of FDG's debts and liabilities to the Caravellas. The
district court's failure to find Hom personally liable should be reversed and a Judgment entered
against Hom personally for all damages, attorney fees and costs awarded against FDG.
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Wendell and Linda Welch (the "Welches") initiated
this adversary proceeding against Lawrence Christopher
Laraway, Jr. ("Laraway"), a chapter 7 debtor, to obtain a
judgment rendering certain claims they allege{fly hold
against Laraway nondiscilargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).
I Tbe matter was tried before the Court on July 21 and
2010, at which time the parties presented evidence
and offered argument. At the conclusion of the trial, the
Court took the § 523(a)(2}(A) issues under advisement. '
Having considered the record, arguments, and applicable
authorities, the Comi issues this memorandum of
decision setting forth its fmdings of fact and conclusions
oflaw. Fed. R. Bank,.. P. 7052.
Unless othenvise indicated, aU statutory
citations are to the Bankruptcy Code, Title J1

U.S. Code, §§ 101-1532.

2 While both the Welches' Complaint, Doc. No.
1, and
Coversheet, Doc.
No.2, refer to
§§ 523 and 727, neither (*2]
the facts
in the Complaint nor the
tlresented at trial
a denial of
under § 727. Consequently, the
Court treats the Welches' claims as
under § 523(a)(1)(A,).
FACTS
In 2006, the Welches decide{f to build a new home.
They acquired a parcel of prope!1y in Boise, Idaho and
contacted Laraway, a general contractor, to discuss
18, 2006, the Welches
construction. On
entered into a construction contract with "Diamond
Ridge Coustruction," Laraway's company, to build their
new residence. Ex. I 00 ("Contract"). Attached to the
four-page Contract wefe plans and specifications
prepared by "Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc. H See
Exs. 100 and 101. Contained within the construction
plans and specifications were several "allowances" of
varying amounts, including a "Fiberglass Pool &.
allowance of $30,000. Based on the plans and
specifications,
calculated, and the Welches
agreed to pay, a total contract bid
of $484,500 for
the project, subject to certain potential increases provided
for in the Contract. '
3 TIlese incfeases included increased material
costs beyond the contractor's control as weIl as
any increased costs associated [*31 with changes
requested by the Welches. These increased costs
became a source of dispute between Laraway and
the Welches over the life oftIle project.
TIle Contract required the Welches to secure a loan
commitment or show proof of financing shortly after
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execution. See Ex. 100. On or about December 21,2006,
the Welches entered il1to a "one time closing" loan
agreement with First Horizon Home Loan Corporation
("First Horizon"). The loan tenns called for periodic
disbursements or "draws," totaling $484,500, as stages of
work were completed on tbe residence.
The Welches took six draws against the loan,
totaling $454,500, between January 10 and July 20,
2007. For each draw made the Welches submitted a
"Draw Request Fonn" ("Request Form") and an
accompanying "All Bills Paid Affidavit" ("Affidavit") to
First Horizon. See Ex. I08. The Request Fonns specified
the amount of funds to be drawn and were accompanied
by an "Itemized Draw Fonn" ("Itemized Fonn") that
identified the line item expenses (e.g., plumbing,
electrical, roofmg) to which the disbursed funds would
be applied. The Request Forms, Itemized Fonns, and
Affidavits were all signed by Laraway, on behalf of
Diamond Ridge Construction, [*4] and either Wendell
or Linda Welch. See Exs. 106, 107, and 218·223.
4

4 Where reference to only one ofthe Welches is
required, the Court will refer to "Wendell" or
"Linda."
Both the Request Fonn and the Affidavit contained
celtifications by Laraway and the Welches that disbursed
funds were being applied to pay for labor and materials
used in the construction of the Welches' home. TIle
Request Faml provided:
General Contractor/Builder and
Bon'ower state that all of the funds that
are requested in this "Draw Request" will
be used to pay for the labor and materials
which created the improvements to the
subject property.
General
Contractor/Builder and Bon'ower fm1her
state that all funds advanced before the
date of this request (if any) were also used
to pay for labor and materials for the
improvements of the subject property.

Ex. 218 (emphasis added). The Affidavit contained a
similar, yet slightly different, statement:
Contractor and Owner state that all of
the funds that Lender has advanced before
the date of this Affidavit (if any), have
been used to pay for labor and materials,
which have created the improvements on
the Property. Contractor and Owner state
that there are no disputes with, [*5] or
debts owed to, any mechanics, material
men, or subcontractors for the labor or

,~

materials furnished. There are no security
interests or liens encumbering the
Property other than those created in favor
of Lender. The only exceptions to this
paragraph are .... 5

5
No exceptions were listed in any of the
Affidavits signed and submitted by Laraway and
the Welches. See Ex 107.
Ex. 107 (emphasis added). vv'hen considered
together with the other loan documents presented at trial,
which indicated that funds would be disbursed only for
completed work, see Ex. 108, these statements suggest a
process whereby requested funds were to be used to pay
outstanding invoices for completed work, as provided for
in the Itemized Fonns, and Laraway and the Welches
were to certity through the Affidavits that all debts owed
to subcontractors, except those to be paid with the draw
being requested, had been paid. The testimony at trial
supp0l1s this reading. In particular, the Welches testified
that their understanding was that the line items identified
in the Itemized Fonns represented the outstanding
expenses that would be paid with the disbursed funds.
Similarly, Laraway testified that he signed the Affidavits
[*6] to indicate that the subcontractors "would be" paid
with the disbursed funds according to the cost breakdown
in the Itemized Fonns.
Work on the Welches' residence stopped in July
2007 after disagreements arose between Laraway and the
Welches conceming responsibility for increased costs
that had accumulated over the course of the project.
These additional expenses stemmed from ce11ain changes
requested by the Welches as well as overages on
previously budgeted items. At the time, the home was
complete except for instaIIation of the pool and spa, for
which $30,000 was still available under the loan, and
some landscaping and other minor work.
Amid this disagreement, the Welches discovered
that some of the subcontractors had not been paid. Tn the
fall of 2007, three ofthe unpaid subcontractors recorded
claims of lien against the Welches' residence -- The
Stucco Company, Inc. ("Stucco") for $31,420,4 Seasons
Heating and Cooling, Inc. ("4 Seasons") for $4,318.99, 6
and Myers Enterprises, Inc. ("Myers Enterprises") for
$18,500. Exs. 112-114. 7 Another subcontractor,
Advanced Marble and Granite ("Advanced Marble"),
filed a small claims action against Laraway and the
Welches for $9,924.50. Ultimately, [*7] the Welches
paid Stucco $19,000 and 4 Seasons $3,810 to settle their
liens. S Wendell Welch testified that the Myers
Enterprises lien no longer encumbers their property,
though he provided no fu11her explanation conceming

Page 3
2010 Baihlu·. LEXIS 3041,
reso lution of the lien. He fU11her testified that Advanced
Marble dismissed their claim against the Welches after
Wendell presented the Itemized Fonn showing Diamond
Ridge Construction had received payment for Advanced
Marble's materials and labor.
6 The 4 Seasons claim of lien included $3,810
for labor and materials plus $144.78 in interest,
$14.21 in costs, and $350 in attomey's fees, for a
total claim of$4,318.99.
7 The Welches testified that Diamond Ridge
Construction also filed a claim of lien on their
property.
8 The Welches were able to negotiate a lower
payment to Stucco based on their assertion that
Stucco's work on their home was substandard and
had resulted in approximately $ 10,000 in
damages.
On July 8, 2008, Laraway caused Diamond Ridge
Construction, Inc. to file a voluntary petition for chapter
7 relief. Approximately one year later, on June 25, 2009,
Laraway filed an individual chapter 7 petition. • The
Welches initiated this adversary proceeding to have [*8]
their claims against Laraway, personally, declared
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).

9 TIle Court takes judicial notice of the filings of
record in both Diamond Ridge Constl1Jction's
corporate bankruptcy, Case No. 08-01342-TLM,
and Laraway's personal bankruptcy, Case No. 0901831-TLM. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. Laraway's
personal bankruptcy case remains open, although
the chapter 7 trustee has filed a report of no
distlibution. Diamond Ridge Construction's
bankruptcy case was closed as a no asset case on
July, 6, 2009. Laraway did not schedule as an
asset in either the corporate case or her personal
case, any debt claimed to be owed by the
Welches.
DISCUSSION AND DISPOSITION

A. Personal liability
Laraway asserts that even if the Court were to find
his conduct fraudulent, he was acting at aIt times on
behalf of Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc., a
corporation, in his interactions with the Welches. Thus,
he contends, any debt owed the Welches arising out of
that relationship is a corporate, rather than personal, debt.
TIle Welches argue that Laraway was doing business
with them not through his corporation, but instead
personally under his assumed business name of Diamond
Ridge Construction.
To [*9] supp0l1 their argument, the Welches point

i.'

to a Certificate of Assumed Business Name of "Diamond
Ridge Cons1J:uction" for Laraway and his ex-wife ,
Jennifer Laraway, filed with the Idaho SecretalY of State
on April 30, 2001, Ex. 105, and emphasize that the
Contract and loan documents identify only "Diamond
Ridge Construction," not "Diamond Ridge Construction,
Inc. ," as the general contractor. In response, Laraway
testified that shortly after obtaining the Certificate of
Assumed Business Name he incorporated the business,
but never took any action to cancel the Certificate as he
was unaware that such action was necessary. 10 To
corroborate his testimony, Laraway introduced a copy of
the Articles of Incorporation for Diamond Ridge
Construction, Inc., filed with the Idaho Secretary of State
on June 28, 200 I. Ex. 200.
lO A certificate of assumed business name filed
with the Secretary of State remains in effect until
the filing of a certificate of cancellation. Idaho
Code §§ 53-506(2), 53-508.

It js weU established that a person coritracting with
another as an gent IS liable as apart}' tQ the contract
unl ss he discloses, torbeforelh ri e of entering into
the contract the a ency relationship 1· i 0] and the
Identity oflhe princip I Se, TTl d Letising,&Fflt., Inc. .v.
Rocky Mountain Rogu~. In . /481c/aho 503, 224 P 3d
1091. J096 (ldoho 1009); w. &ds, I nc. v. BCVfll, 109
Idaho 70, 70/ P 2d 97/,975. (Idaho App 1985). The
party asserting agency as a defense to personal liabilily
on a con ct bears the burden of showing th ( the
principal was adequately disclosed. Kellttr Loren: Co. ·v.
Ins. A socs Corp., 98 Maho 678. 570 P.ld /J66. /J69
(Idaho 1977) (deeming agency
defense 10 personal
contrac.t lillbilityan affirm Ii e defense for purposes of
Rid· 8(c) oflheldaho Rules of Civil pr~edure).
The Court finds that [he ContraCt ilSel,. did not
adequately disclose Ihal Lara '3y was acting as the a enl
of Diamond Ridge C nstrucrion Inc. At ' best the
ontra¢tis ambiguo as to the identity of the contractor.
Had the Contract indicated Laraway was signing in a
repent live c
ity on behalf of Diamond · Ridge
Construclion. Inc., " there woul be no ambiguity nd
Laraway 'ould have no persona l liability Wlder t~'e
Contract. Se Triad UQ ing. lU P.ld at 1096. Howe er,
~he Can ct was not so executed and the description of
lhe conlractin
party . states " Diamond Ride
Construction- , ithno Mlne.N or otherindicatio .o f
corporate [·'1] structure. Though the Contract refers ·10
"Diamond Ridge Construction, , c."·aS .tJle author of the
attached building specifications, lhat single reference is
insufficient to overcome the ambiguitie from the manner
cif e. ecution and tJle Contnict pta ision identifying
"Di mond Ridge COl1$lrUction" as the general contnlcto .
See E;( 100.

11

Such an executior'l would in substance read:
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"Diamond Ridge Construction, .Inc., by Lawrence
Christopller Laraway, Jr" President." The
Contract here was executed: "Contractor's
Signature," foflowedby Laraway's signature.
Laraway also contends tha~ the footer on the
building specifications, 'Nhid~ provides "Registered
rdaho Conti-actot RCE-3105," supports his position that
Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc.· was the contracting
party because "RCE· 3105" was
contractor
registration number assigned to Diamond Ridge
Construction, Jnc, See E.. 202. 12 The 'Court is
un ' '. rs ded. Wendell testified that when he signedlhe
Contract he ,'as un wate that the footer ref! rre.d to the
tonlrattregistralion nw be " of DiamoncfRid e
Construction, In.c. It .' as not the. Welchcs'burden to
inquirefunher as to the meaning of n abstruse footer. in
the buildingpecificalions
ched
[·11) 10 the
Contract e burden was on La way to conspiCuously
infonn the Welches th t the contracting p rty\\'
Diamond Rjdge Construction. fnc. ir be desired in. 0 e
the liabi lity protections affo(dedby the corpOI'ate
structure. See Infer/odeConslrocfor.r, b re. v. Br),onf; 132
fdaho443, 9 4 P.ld 89, 9i-"93 (Idaho pp. 1999).

to

12 Under Idaho law, any person engaged in the
business of, or holding himself out to be, a
contractor must be registered with the State of
Idaho Contractors Board. See Idaho Code § 545204.

In sum, the Contract, on its face, did not adequately

disclose that Laraway was acting as the agent of
Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc.
H8 ing follnd the Contract iri~dequate forpurpo~es
of disclosing Diamon'Ci Ridge Connruclion. Inc. .as
Laraway's principaJ, the Court looks to evidence outside
the Con ct to determine , helher such a disclosure
oc.cum:d. Laraway asse$ that hi initial meeting with
the. Welches ~hould h ve made clear to Ihm! th t they
w;ei'e d " lin .\ ilh Diamond Ridge onstruction, Inc.
S~cific8I1y. Laraway testified th t t Ihe initial meetin
he \,"ould he given the Welche 8 "Client Introduction
Packet." Ex. No. 212. which references Diamond Ridge
CO~$tnJctio • Inc. Lara vay further [· '3] testified t
there was a franled c pyof Diamond Ridge
Construction. Inc.'s con ctor Iicen~ . 202, hanging
oii the wall in the. office '~here he met \ ith the Welches.

TIle Cqurt tiridsthallhe "Client lntroductiori P c etl!
and the presence of the coo clor's Iiccn e in Laraw y's
oJfictdid Dot ufficiently disclc) 10 tbe Welches that
Lanl\vay \ ' gcling as t'he agent ' of Diamond Ridge
Construction, Inc. At trial, Wendell did 110t recall
receiving the "Clienl Introduction Packet," and 'en if
the Welches had received such a packet t.here was no
evidence lh t they ' re d it; ,or thalhey would Jiave
understood it to mean they werecpntr2ctirig with

e

Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc., not Laraway.
Wendell further testified that he never noticed the
contractor's license on the wall of Laraway's office. The
ontis was 0'11 Laraway to clearly indicate to the Welches,
before orat the time of the Contract, that he was acting
as the agent of Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc. See
biterlode ConstruCtors, 974 P.2d at 92-93. His failure to
do so left him exposed to personal liability on the
Contract.
Laraway's personal liability under the Contract does
not end the analysis. While the Couit fulds that Laraway
[*14] was a party to the Contract for purposes of contract
liability, liabilities excepted from discharge under §
523(a)(2)(A), such as those alleged here, sound in fi:aud,
not contract.
Corporate d' . ctors and offite.rs may not be held
liable. fOT fraud or . er t l1ious \ ongdoing committed
by the corporalion or its officers merely by virtue of their
office. LB. Indus., Iflc. v. Smi,h, 8/7. F.2d 69,71 (9,,,
Cir.. 198). However; .a corporate director or officer.m y
beheld Iiable~f . he speciti lIy . directs, actively
partlcip tes in, or knowingly 8cquie$Ccs in the fraud or
other\\Tongdolng of the corp liolior its officers. ld.;
see,i/soSe Bell v. Smith (In rlf SmiTh) 98.4 I.8.C.R.
119. 110 (B
. 0 Idaho 1998); N~/son
Post Falls
luzda ('n re Nelson). 150 BR. 9U. 9}5-26 (8onkr. D .
Idaho 1993); fit rt! H01rltins, 144 B.R. ./8/, ' .f8.J.:85
(Banh-. D. Idaho 1991).
The evidence ~stablishes Laraway as an active
participant in dealing with the Welches -- be negotiated
Ihe Con ct, signed it and all the Itemized Fonns nd
Affidavits. and was r
nsible for ensuring pa}1nent of
the . subcontractors from the disbursed funds..H~ \vas
directly involved in e ery aspect the project,
was
the only corporate [- IS] ome« involved in ens ring
Diamond Ridge COllstructio properly perfonned.TIlus
way may be held personally liable Und §
5~J(Q)( ~(.-I) to the e. tent the Welches' allegationS .that
theY"ere defr8uded ate proven true. This con.cll,lSion
Will rest on evidence of LarawaY's conduct, .imspec~ive
ofany persollal liability he
on tMContract n

of

13 Because of this required focus on Laraway's
conduct, the COUIt will refer to his acts in the
following discussion.
B. Sectioll 523(a)(2)(A)

This is not the frrst time the Court has been tasked
with considering § 523(a)(2)(A) claims in the context of
a residential construction project. See. e.g., Mire v.
Ankersmit (In re Allkersmit), 03.1 LB.C.R. 71 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 2003) (finding plaintiffs failed to prove all of §
523(a)(2)(A) elements with respect to debtor contractor's
failure to pay subcontractors Wl10 worked Oll plaintiffs'
home); Bell V. Smith (111 re Smith), 232 B.R. 461 (Bal1kr.
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D. Idaho 1998) (concluding contractor's debts arising
fi'om claims of lien against plaintiffs' homes were
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A)); Custer v. Dobbs
(In re Dobbs), 115 B.R. 258 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990)
(same).

Section 523(a)(2)(4) excepts from discharge any
[*16] debt "for money, property, services, or an
extension, renewal, or refInancing of credit, to the extent
obtained by -- false pretenses, a false representation, or
actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
debtor's or an insider's fInancial condition." To prevail on
a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A) a plaintiff mllst prove the
following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) misrepresentation, fi'audulent omission, or deceptive
conduct by the debtor in obtaining money, property,
services Of credit; (2) debtor's knowledge ofthe falsity or
deceptiveness ofllis statement or conduct; (3) an intent to
deceive; (4) justifiable reliance by the creditor 011 the
debtor's statement or conduct; and (5) damage to the
creditor proximately caused by its reliance on the
debtor's statement or conduct. Fetty v. DL Carlson
Enterprises, Inc. (In re Carlson), 426 B,R. 840, 854
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2010) (citing Ninth Circuit authorities).
In applying exceptions to discharge, the COUlt must
construe § 523(a)(2)(A) strictly against the creditor and
liberally in favor of the debtor so as to avoid reading the
statute more broadly than necessmy to effectuate th.e
policy of preventing debtors fi'om avoiding [*17] debts
lllcUlTed by fraud or other culpable conduct Id.

1. False representations
The Welches identify three representations or groups
of representations made by Laraway that they allege
constitute false representations.
a. The pool and spa allowance
The first is the provision in the building plans and
specifications establishing a $30,000 "allowance" for the
purchase and installation of a pool and spa. The Welches
claim the pool mld spa allowance provision was a
promissOlY representation that the pool and spa they
requested would be purchased and installed for $30,000.
They further contend that at the time Laraway made this
promise, he knew he could not obtain and install both the
pool and spa for $30,000.
A promise made without a present intent to perf01111
satisfIes § 523(a)(2)(A), as does a representation which
the debtor knew or should have known was outside of the
debtor's prospective ability to perfonn. Smith, 98.4
I.B.CR. at 121 (quoting McCrary v. Barrack (In re
Barrack), 217 B.R. 598,606 (9th Cit. BAP 1998)).
Laraway knew or should have known he would be
unable to provide and install the pool and spa for
$30,000, Laraway testified that the pool and spa

allowance in the Contract was ["18] derived from a
2006 installation list he received fi'om Viking Pools, Ex.
214.'4 Therein, installation ofa "Cannel" pool (the type
called for in the Welches' building plans) was listed
between $29,020 and $38,552. 15 The least expensive spa
was listed at $12,095, Consequently, the Viking Pools
list would have dictated a minimum bid or estinlate of
$41,115 (i.e., $29,020 + $12,095), more than $11,000
above the $30,000 pool and spa allowance Laraway
represented to the Welches. Although Laraway contends
that the $30,000 figure was merely an estimate, the Court
fmds his conduct, given the info1111ation upon which he
based his estimate, to be sufficiently deceptive to satisfY
the first clement of § 523(a)(2)(A). 16
14
Laraway never provided the Welches the
Viking Pools installation list or any other
documentation to support the pool and spa
allowance. It was only during this litigation, and
more specifically when it was introduced by
Laraway during the trial, that the list surfaced.

15
The price list offered four possible
installation packages of varying cost, ranging
from the least expensive, the "Bronze" package,
to the most expensive, the "Platinum" package.
See Ex. 214.

16
The Welches identified
[* 19] other
provisions III the contract and building plans that
they also believed to be false representations,
including a plumbing allowance of $8,000 and a
roofing estimate of $16,875.06. However, no
evidence was introduced to show that Laraway
did not intend to perfonn consistent with those
estimates, nor is there sufficient evidence to infer
such an intent. Indeed, the only evidence
presented was Laraway's testimony that the
estimates he gave the Welches were based 01]
bids or estimates he had received from
subcontractors.
h. The Affidavits
The second set of representations identified by the
Welches are Laraway's serial asseliions in the Affidavits
that there were no disputes with, 01' debts owed to, any
mechanics, materialmen, or subcontractors for the Jabor
or materials fumished in the construction of the Welches'
residence. Specifically, the Welches contend that these
representations were false as to Stucco, 4 Seasons, Myers
Enterprises, and Advanced Marble, as evidenced by the
claims they eventually asserted against the Welches or
their property. 11
17 The COUlt recognizes that in their Complaint,
the Welches did not asseli the 4 Seasons claim of
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lien as a basis for Ilondischargeability. [*20]
Having been ftlll tried by the parties, the COUlt
treats the issue of the 4 Seasons claim as if raised
in the pleadings. See Fed R. Bank,.. P. 7015
(making applicable Fed R. Civ. P. 15(b)) The
same analysis and conclusion apply to the
Welches' claim regarding the $3,000 for
appliances, which was also not pleaded in their
Complaint.
The evidence demonstrates that Laraway's
representations with respect to payment of these
subcontractors were false. The claims filed by the four
subcontractors for unpaid invoices belie Laraway's
assertions in the Affidavits regarding prior payment and
lack of dispute. In fact, Laraway tcstified that he did not
know whether all the subcontractors had been paid when
he signed the Affidavits and that, even at the time of trial,
he was unsure of who had been paid. Even absent direct
e~idence of knowing misrepresentation, such reckless
dIsregard for the truth of a representation satisfies the
element that the debtor has made an intentionally false
representation. See, e.g., Arm v. lv/orrison (In re Arm),
175 B.R. 349, 354 (9th Gr. BAP 1994).
c. Appliances
The final representation identified by the Welches is
the July 20, 2007 Itemized Fonn which allocated $3,000
[*21] of yet to be disbursed fimds to the purchase of
appliances for the Welches' new home. The Welches
testified that no appliances were ever purchased by
Laraway, and that they were later required to purchase
the appliances 011 their own. "
18 As evidence of the appliance purchases the
Welches presented an invoice and receipt from
Home Depot for $9,449.06. See Exs. 110 and
Ill.
.
T.he July 20 Itemized Form does not qualifY as an
mtentlOnally false representation. As previously noted,
the understanding between Laraway and the Welches
was that the disbursed funds would be used to pay the
expenses identified in the Itemized Fonns. Thus, at most,
listing the $3,000 for appliances constituted a promise by
Laraway to use $3,000 of the yet to be disbursed funds to
buy appliances. 1. While the evidence indicates no
appliances were ever purchased by Laraway, there is no
proof that Laraway did not intend to use $3,000 of the
funds to buy appliances when he fined out and signed the
Itemized Fonn. Because the Welches failed to sI~ow that
Laraway did not intend to perform on his promise, their §
523(a)(2){A) claim as to the appliances representation
will be dismissed.
19 Laraway did not sign an Affidavit [*22]
subsequent to the July 20 draw request, as that

*

draw was the last made against the loan.
Consequently, the only representation made by
Laraway concerning the appliances was the
$3,000 allocation in the Itemized Fonll portion of
the July 20 draw request.
2. Intent to Deceive
Not only must there be a representation of material
fad which is false, the representation must be made with
the intention and purpose to deceive. Ankersmit, 03.1
I.B.C.R. at 73. Intent to deceive is a question of fact that
may be infen'ed fi-om circumstantial evidence. Cowen v.
Kennedy (In re Kenl1ed)~, 108 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir.
1997).
TIle Court finds Laraway intended to deceive the
Welches regarding the S30,000 pool and spa allowance.
Laraway knew at the time he executed the contract that
he lacked the ability to provide and install a pool and spa
to specifications for the amount of $30,000. It is
reasonable to infer from the whole of this record that his
purpose in presenting an infeasible allowance was to
deceive the Welches as to the true cost for the pool and
spa in order to induce them into signing the contract.
The Court finds Laraway also intended to deceive
the Welches when he signed the Affidavits. Laraway
[*23] testified that he intended to pay the subcontractors
and suppliers, that alI of the funds advanced to him were
spent on labor and materials used in the Welches' home
that he made no profit on construction of the Welche;'
home, and that any unpaid invoices were solely the result
of unexpected overages or upgrades the Welches
requested after construction had begun. He further
testi~ed that he signed the Affidavits to keep the project
movmg forward, and planned to pay any unpaid
subcontractors with the additional funds he expected the
Welches to cOIltribute for extra costs (those not
contem~lated by the original plans and budget) that had
been pmd as construction progressed.
Several pieces of evidence presented at trial impeacIl
Laraway's testimony. First, the Itemized Forms submitted
:vit? each of the Welches' six draw requests, Ex. 106,
mdlcate that $44,215.88 of the funds disbursed under the
loan were allocated to "Builder Overhead and Profit"
contradicting Laraway's testimony that he realized
profit on the project. 20

1;0

20
The reliability of the Itemized Fonus
standing alone, is equivocal. Indeed, the Welche;'
case is largely premised on the allegation tllat the
disbursed funds were [*24] not used in the
manner prescribed by the Itemized Fonns, and
the evidence, which includes the subcontractor
claims against the Welches as well as Laraway's
testinlony, supports this view. Still, Laraway
never reconciled the documental}' evidence with
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his assel1ions that no profit was taken. Nor did he
establish where the money did go ifnot to himself
or to the unpaid suppliers and subcontractors.
Second, the "Job Cost Detail" for the Welches'
residence produced fi'om Diamond Ridae Construction's
business records, Ex. 225 ("Detail"), ~hen considered
together with the liens and other claims filed against the
Vv'el~hes, further contradicts Laraway's testimony. The
DetaIl, generated August 16, 2007, shows the draws and
invoices received by Diamond Ridge Construction for
the Welches' residence. 21 According to the Detail,
Diamond Ridge Construction received draws totalin<>
$45~,500, and invoices totaling $450,724.80, resulting i~
a dIfference of $3,775.20. The Detail included invoice
amounts consistent with the claims asserted by the
unpaid subcontractors -- i.e., Stucco for $31,420, 4
Seasons for $3,810, 22 Myers Enterprises for $18,500, and
Advanced Marble for $9,924.50. Together tIle Detail
[*25J showing total invoices $3, 775.20 le~s than total
draws, and the unpaid subcontractors' claims, totaling
$63,654.50, suggest that at least $67,429.70 of the
disbursed funds were not used In labor and materials on
the Welch job.
21
The Detail does not indicate whether the
invoices were actually paid.
22 See supra note 6.

The liens and related claims asserted against the
Welches, together with the Itemized Fornls and the
Detail, support the inference that some of the
disbursements were diverted to purposes other than
payment for labor and materials used in the Welches'
home. No other rational explanation, consistent with the
documentary evidence, was suggested. Based on this
evidence and these circumstances, the Court concludes
that Laraway's statements in the Affidavits that no debts
were owed to subcontractors were knowingly false and
made with an intent to deceive the Welches and induce
them into authorizing further disbursements.

3. Reliance
Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires justifiable reliance.
Smith, 03.1 I.B.CR. at 121 (citing Field v. Mans, 516
US. 59, 70-71, 116 S. Ct. 437, 133 L. Ed 2d 351
(1995)). Justifiable reliance is a subjective standard
which requires the Court to consider the qualities and
characteristics of [*26] the particular plaintiff, the
knowledge and relationship of the patties, and all of the
circumstances surrounding the particular transaction.
Field, 516 US. at 71; Eugene Parks Law C01p. Defined
Benefit Pension Plan v. Kirsh (In re Kirsh), 973 F.2d
1454, 1458-60 (9th Cir. 1992). W11i1e justifiable reliance
does not require that a creditor investigate the truth of the
representation in each case, an investigation is required

*

"where, under the circumstances, the facts should be
apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence fi'om a
cursory glance, or he has discovered something which
should serve as a warning that he is being deceived."
Smith, 03.1 I.B.C.R. at 122 (quoting Field, 516 Us. at
71).
TIle Welches justifiably relied on the $30,000 pool
and spa allowance in the Contract. They specifically
requested that the pool and spa be included in the
building plans before signing the contract, and testified
that it was a material tenn.

TIle Welches also justifiably relied on Laraway's
representations in the Affidavits that all the
subcontractors had been paid. They relied on the fact that
outstanding costs were being paid fi:om monies disbursed
to D~amond Ridge Construction. It was only [*27] after
all SIX draws had been made against the loan that the
Welches discovered Laraway had not paid some of the
subcontractors. There were no circumstances which
would have served as a waming to the Welches that they
were being deceived and the subcontractors were going
unpaid. It is also reasonable for the Court to accept the
Welches' assertions that, had they known the
s~bcontractors were not being
paid, further
dIsbursements would have been conditioned or
suspended pending resolution of any unpaid
subcontractor bills.
4. Loss suffered
The Welches have not shown they were damaged by
their reliance on the $30,000 pool and spa allowance.
The $30,000 earmarked for the pool and spa was never
drawn out from the available loan proceeds, and the
~elches present~? no evidence to show that they
1l1curred any addItIOnal cost by canying that amount on
the loan. Nor did they present evidence of legal fees or
other costs resulting fi·om reliance on the pool and spa
al1owance. The Welches bear the burden of proving that
they were damaged by their reliance on Laraway's
representation, which they have failed to do. Because the
W?lches have not proven they were damaged by their
[*28] prevail 011 their §
relIance, they canllot
523(a}(2}(AJ claim as to the pool and spa allowance.
The Welches did suffer a financial loss as a direct
result of their reliance on Laraway's statements in the
Affidavits. They were forced to pay $22,810 to settle
claims of lien -- $19,000 to Stucco and $3,810 to 4
Seasons. While Wendell testified that the Welches also
lllcun'ed attorney's fees and costs in conjullction with the
Stucco lien, no evidence was presented regarding the
amounts of those fees and costs. In the absence of such
~vidence, the Court lacks the specificity required to
1l1clude attomey's fees and costs incun'ed by the Welches
as part .of the damage caused by Laraway's
representatIOns. See Car/son, 426 B.R. at 858 ("A
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plaintiff must prove the specific amount of the damage
caused by the fi'audulent representation."). Consequently,
the Court finds that the Welches were damaged in the
amount 0[$22,810.

*

Const111ction, Inc's bankruptcy case, Case No. 0801342-TLM, or his own personal bankruptcy
case, Case No. 09-01831-TLM.

D. Attorney's Fees
C. Setoff
At trial, Laraway argued that any liability the COUli
found on his part should be reduced by the $30,000 of
the $484,500 contract price the Welches never disbursed
to Diamond Ridge Construction. Laraway's argument is
in essence one for setoff -- the adjustment of mutual
debts arising out of separate [*29] transactions between
the paIties. See SA1F Corp. v. Harmon (In re Harmon),
188 B.R. 421, 425 (9th Cir. BAP 1995). Z3 To invoke a
right to setoff there must be mutuality. "Mutuality is
satisfied when the 'parties have concurrent rights against
each other.'" In re Lifestyle Furnishings, LLC, 418 B.R.
382, 386 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (quoting In re Hiplvell,
97.1 I.B.C.R. 25, 27, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2430, 1997 WL
34584333, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1997)).
23
The transactions at issue here would be
"separate" because the $30,000 claim alluded to
by Laraway is a contract liability, while his debt
to the Welches sounds in fi·aud.
Here, there is no mutuality because Laraway holds
no right against the Welches. As noted previously, the
Contract and loan documents contemplated payment in
stages upon the completion of work. The pool and spa
were never installed. Accordingly, Laraway had no right
to the $30,000 to be paid out for that work.
Moreover, even if Laraway had such a right under
the Contract, that right became part of Laraway's
bankruptcy estate when he filed his chapter 7 petition.
See Kaler v. Craig (In re Craig), 144 F.3d 593, 596 (8th
Cir. 1998) ("A debtor's right to setoff is propeliy of the
[*30] (citing 5 Collier on
bankruptcy estate.")
Bankruptcy P 553.03[7][b] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th
ed. 1998)). 14 Therefore, the Court concludes that
Laraway has no right to the remaining $30,000, and those
fimds are unavailable to Laraway as a means to reduce or
offset his liability under § 523(a)(2)(A).
24 Laraway did not schedule a contract claim
against the Welches in either Diamond Ridge

In their Complaint, the Welches request an award for
attomey's fees incurred in prosecuting this action. To
recover attorney's fees inculTed in pursuing a §
523(a)(2)(A) action, a creditor must be able to recover
the fees outside the bankruptcy court under state or
federal law. Kilborn v. Hazm ([n re Hal/n), 396 B.R. 522,
526-27 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008) (quoting Levitt v. Cook
(In re Levitt), BAP No. AZ-07-1166, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS
4683 (9th Cir. BAP July 22, 2008)).
111e Welches request attomey's fees "pursuant to an
applicable section of the bmh1mIptcy code, common law,
or to the extent not exempted, state law." First, there is
no general right to recover attorney's fees under the
Bankruptcy Code. Id at 526. Second, [*31] under Idaho
law, to recover on a claim for attorney's fees a party must
asselt in its pleadings the specific statute, rule or case
authority supporting its claim, lei. at 528 (citing Hopkins
v. Saratoga Holdings, LIC (In re Colvin), 08.2 IB.CR.
63, 652008 WL 1957855, at *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008)).
The Welches failed to so identify specific authority that
would entitle them to attorney's fees. Therefore, their
request for fees is denied.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the reasons set fOlth above, the Court
frnds that the Welches' have proven the requirements
necessary under § 523(a)(2)(A) to support ajudgment by
this COUlt that debts arising fro111 the settlement of claims
of lien against the Welches' home in the amount of
$22,810 should be excepted from discharge.
Counsel for the Welches shall submit an appropriate
order and fom1 ofjudgment.
DATED: September 13,2010
/s/ Teny L. Myers
TERRY L. MYERS
CHIEF U. S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

